Table Of ContentContents: Interpretation and Law: Why is Interpretation for Law?: Law philosophy and interpretation, Ronald Dworkin; Why interpret?, Joseph Raz. Interpretation and Legal Reasoning: Law and Morality: Law as practical reason, M.J. Detmold; Legal reasoning and legal theory revisited, Fernando Atria; A natural law theory of interpretation, Michael S. Moore. Interpretation and Application of Legal Rules, Vagueness and Defeasibility: Justification and application of norms, Robert Alexy; Critical remarks on Robert Alexy's 'special case thesis', Klaus Günther; Law, love and computers, Zenon Bankowski; On law and logic, Carlos E. Alchourrón. Legal Interpretation and Politics: Legal analysis as institutional imagination, Roberto Mangabiera Unger; The inertia of institutional imagination: a reply to Roberto Unger, Emilios A. Christodoulis. Interpretation and Objectivity: Law and metaphysics, Charles M. Yablon; Kripke's case: some remarks on rules, their interpretation and application, Jes Bjarup; Working on the chain gang: interpretation in law and literature, Stanley Fish. Interpreting the Law: Normative and narrative coherence in legal decision-making, Jan M. van Dunné; On justification and interpretation, Jerzy Wróblewski and Neil MacCormick; Authority reasons in legal interpretation and moral reasoning, Aleksander Peczenik; 2 types of substantive reasons: the core of a theory of common-law justification, Robert S. Summers; Reasonableness and objectivity, Neil MacCormick; Name index.
SynopsisIt has long been recognised that textual sources (constitutions, statutes, precedents, commentaries) are central to 'developed' systems of law and that interpretation of such texts is one highly important element in adjudication, legal practice and legal scholarship. Leading recent essays on interpretation are assembled in this volume, which offsets them against a small number of 'classical' works from earlier periods., Leading contemporary essays on interpretation are assembled in this volume, which offsets them against a small number of classical works from earlier periods. It has long been recognized that textual sources (constitutions, statutes, precedents, commentaries) are central to developed systems of law and that interpretation of such texts is one highly important element in adjudication, legal practice and legal scholarship. Scholars have also contended that the totality of legal activity is interpretive in a wider sense and debates about objectivity have raged. The reasons for this development are here critically scrutinized.