About this product

Product Identifiers

PublisherOxford University Press, Incorporated

ISBN-10019968894X

ISBN-139780199688944

eBay Product ID (ePID)26038912851

Product Key Features

Number of Pages208 Pages

Publication NameSeven Puzzles of Thought : and How to Solve Them: an Originalist Theory of concepts

LanguageEnglish

Publication Year2013

SubjectMind & Body, Epistemology, Cognitive Psychology & Cognition, Logic

TypeTextbook

AuthorMichael Tye, R. M. Sainsbury

Subject AreaPhilosophy, Psychology

FormatUk-Trade Paper

Dimensions

Item Height0.5 in

Item Weight14.4 Oz

Item Length9.2 in

Item Width6.1 in

Additional Product Features

Intended AudienceScholarly & Professional

Reviews"Review from previous edition This engaging, briskly written collaboration presents an original (pardon the pun) theory of concepts ... [Sainsbury and Tye's] theory is highly interesting and their discussion generally illuminating." --Choice, 'Review from previous edition This engaging, briskly written collaboration presents an original (pardon the pun) theory of concepts ... [Sainsbury and Tye's] theory is highly interesting and their discussion generally illuminating. 'Choice

Dewey Edition23

Dewey Decimal121

Table Of ContentPreface1. The puzzles2. Roads not taken3. Overview of an originalist theory of concepts4. The originalist theory defended and elaborated5. Concept externalism, originalism and privileged access6. The metaphysics of thought7. The puzzles solved8. Further applications: originalism and experience9. Objections and repliesReferencesIndex

SynopsisSainsbury and Tye present a new theory, "originalism," which provides natural, simple solutions to puzzles about thought that have troubled philosophers for centuries. They argue that concepts are to be individuated by their origin, rather than epistemically or semantically. Although thought is special, no special mystery attaches to its nature., How can one think about the same thing twice without knowing that it's the same thing? How can one think about nothing at all (for example Pegasus, the mythical flying horse)? Is thinking about oneself special? One could mistake one's car for someone else's, but it seems one could not mistake one's own headache for someone else's. Why not? Mark Sainsbury and Michael Tye provide an entirely new theory--called "originalism"-- which provides simple and natural solutions to these puzzles and more. Originalism's central thesis is that concepts, the constituents of thoughts, are to be individuated by their origin, rather than epistemically or semantically. The doctrine has further valuable consequences for the nature of thought, our knowledge of our own thoughts, the nature of experience, the epistemology of perception-based beliefs, and for arguments based on conceivability. Sainsbury and Tye argue that although thought is special, there is no special mystery attaching to the nature of thought. Their account of the mind considers it as part of nature, as opposed to something with supernatural powers--which means that human beings have more opportunities to make mistakes than many have liked to think., How can one think about the same thing twice without knowing that it's the same thing? How can one think about nothing at all (for example Pegasus, the mythical flying horse)? Is thinking about oneself special? One could mistake one's car for someone else's, but it seems one could not mistake one's own headache for someone else's. Why not?Mark Sainsbury and Michael Tye provide an entirely new theory--called 'originalism'-- which provides simpleand natural solutions to these puzzles and more. Originalism's central thesis is that concepts, the constituents of thoughts, are to be individuated by their origin, rather than epistemically orsemantically. The doctrine has further valuable consequences for the nature of thought, our knowledge of our own thoughts, the nature of experience, the epistemology of perception-based beliefs, and for arguments based on conceivability. Sainsbury and Tye argue that although thought is special, there is no special mystery attaching to the nature of thought. Their account of the mind considers it as part of nature, as opposed to something with supernatural powers--which means that human beingshave more opportunities to make mistakes than many have liked to think.

LC Classification NumberB105.T54