Praeger Studies of Foreign Policies of the Great Powers Ser.: Italian Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period : 1918-1940 by H. James Burgwyn (1997, Hardcover)
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About this product
Product Identifiers
PublisherBloomsbury Publishing USA
ISBN-100275948773
ISBN-139780275948771
eBay Product ID (ePID)674854
Product Key Features
Number of Pages240 Pages
LanguageEnglish
Publication NameItalian Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period : 1918-1940
Publication Year1997
SubjectEurope / Italy, International Relations / General, World, Europe / General
TypeTextbook
Subject AreaPolitical Science, History
AuthorH. James Burgwyn
SeriesPraeger Studies of Foreign Policies of the Great Powers Ser.
FormatHardcover
Dimensions
Item Height0.8 in
Item Weight20 Oz
Item Length9 in
Item Width6 in
Additional Product Features
Intended AudienceCollege Audience
LCCN96-043874
Reviews"Burgwyn's clearly written survey steers a compromise course amid conflicting recent interpretations of Mussolini's foriegn policy.... This book's straightforward prose and chronological arrangement will appeal to students." Choice
Dewey Edition20
Number of Volumes1 vol.
IllustratedYes
Dewey Decimal327.45
Table Of ContentIntroduction Italy at the Paris Peace Conference Mussolini in Power Italian Revisionism The Grandi Era 1933: Annus Diabolicus Mussolini's Danubian Strategy Italy's Imperialist Adventure The Italian Empire: A Hollow Triumph The Dictators Converge Consolidation of the Axis War Conclusion Notes Bibliography Index
SynopsisItaly emerged from the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 with the feeling that it had been denied its just rewards by ungrateful allies and that its victory was thus mutilated. Integrating this vengefulness into his diplomacy in the 1920s, Mussolini undertook a policy of selected treaty revision aimed at the breakup of the newly created state of Yugoslavia through covert operations. These stratagems proved futile. Ignoring the threat posed by Nazi Germany's obvious determination to annex Austria, whose continued independence was key to Italy's security in Europe, Mussolini successfully invaded Ethiopia in October 1935, with only lukewarm opposition from France and Britain. Subsequently, in July 1936, he unwisely intervened on the side of the insurgent general Francisco Franco against the Republican government in Madrid. Instead of the expected speedy victory, Italy got bogged down in a prolonged civil war, which rendered Mussolini even more dependent on Nazi Germany. To preserve his standing in Berlin, he did not lift a finger when the Third Reich marched into Austria in 1938. Convinced of the growing decadence of the Western democracies, Mussolini turned to forge the Rome-Berlin Axis. But given Italy's military weakness, Mussolini was bound to be Hitler's junior partner. When the Duce talked of turning the Mediterranean Sea into an Italian lake in February 1939, he found himself trapped in Hitler's military iron cage. Parity in the Axis was the Duce's own peculiar myth. When Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, Mussolini declared nonbelligerency since he was in no position to wage war. He intended to bide his time in order to see who would win or, in the event of a stalemate, to step in as a mediator. But when the Nazi steamroller crushed France, Mussolini felt he had only one option--war on the side of Germany. By tying himself to Hitler's war chariot, Mussolini sacrificed the national interests of his country and doomed his Fascist regime to ultimate destruction.