About this product

Product Identifiers

PublisherHarvard University Press

ISBN-100674023862

ISBN-139780674023864

eBay Product ID (ePID)57169910

Product Key Features

Number of Pages312 Pages

Publication NameTo the Maginot Line : the Politics of French Military Preparation in the 1920's

LanguageEnglish

Publication Year2006

SubjectMilitary / World War II, Military / Strategy, Europe / France, International Relations / General

TypeTextbook

AuthorJudith Markham Hughes

Subject AreaPolitical Science, History

SeriesHarvard Historical Monographs

FormatPerfect

Dimensions

Item Height0.8 in

Item Weight12.8 Oz

Item Length7.7 in

Item Width5.5 in

Additional Product Features

Intended AudienceScholarly & Professional

LCCN2006-043731

Dewey Edition22

Reviews[A] stimulating and excellently documented book...Individual personalities are particularly well handled. Foch and PÉtain, PoincarÉ and Blum--all emerge with veritable life in them. The trends of French interwar history are deftly carried through onto these pages with an unobtrusive lucidity and persuasiveness., [A] stimulating and excellently documented book...Individual personalities are particularly well handled. Foch and Petain, Poincare and Blum--all emerge with veritable life in them. The trends of French interwar history are deftly carried through onto these pages with an unobtrusive lucidity and persuasiveness., ÝAn¨ admirable little monograph...ÝHughes¨ has demonstrated what can be done to overcome obstacles of official secrecy through resourcefulness in collecting evidence and ingenuity in interpretation. Moreover, instead of working backward from 1940, seeking causes and culprits of collapse in the 1930s, Ms. Hughes has wisely chosen to begin in 1918 and to focus upon the 1920s. This chronology has given her a fresher perspective and a wider scope for sympathy than other commentators of the period. It is the great merit of this book that it passes judgments with compassion and restraint. Indeed, Professor Hughes insists upon viewing French military policy in the broadest possible context of international developments, domestic politics, economic problems, and intellectual moods; from these elements, she weaves a dilemma of tragic dimensions in which the confusions and mistakes of individuals are reviewed with kindness and realism. -- Charles C. Bright "Political Science Quarterly" (09/01/1973), [An] admirable little monograph...[Hughes] has demonstrated what can be done to overcome obstacles of official secrecy through resourcefulness in collecting evidence and ingenuity in interpretation. Moreover, instead of working backward from 1940, seeking causes and culprits of collapse in the 1930s, Ms. Hughes has wisely chosen to begin in 1918 and to focus upon the 1920s. This chronology has given her a fresher perspective and a wider scope for sympathy than other commentators of the period. It is the great merit of this book that it passes judgments with compassion and restraint. Indeed, Professor Hughes insists upon viewing French military policy in the broadest possible context of international developments, domestic politics, economic problems, and intellectual moods; from these elements, she weaves a dilemma of tragic dimensions in which the confusions and mistakes of individuals are reviewed with kindness and realism., [A] stimulating and excellently documented book...Individual personalities are particularly well handled. Foch and Ptain, Poincar and Blum--all emerge with veritable life in them. The trends of French interwar history are deftly carried through onto these pages with an unobtrusive lucidity and persuasiveness., Dr. Judith Hughes has devised a modest title for her very wide sweep of interbellum French military history. Not content with penetrating analyses of the post war "population problem," the intricacies of politico-military relations, the unfolding formulation of strategic-tactical concepts in light of 1914-1918, the intermeshing of foreign and military policy, and, on title-target, the political alignments in legislating army reform and frontier organization (Maginot Line), Dr. Hughes offers an epilogue on the implication of the 1920s for the 1930s and even for May-June 1940. If at times Dr. Hughes covers familiar ground, she does so with the same thoroughness and perception she exhibits in more "original" sections of this well-researched book., ÝA¨ stimulating and excellently documented book...Individual personalities are particularly well handled. Foch and Peacute; tain, Poincareacute; and Blum--all emerge with veritable life in them. The trends of French interwar history are deftly carried through onto these pages with an unobtrusive lucidity and persuasiveness. -- Michael Hurst "American Historical Review" (02/01/1974)

Series Volume Number64

Dewey Decimal355.7094409022

Synopsis"[A] stimulating and excellently documented book...Individual personalities are particularly well handled. Foch and Pétain, Poincaré and Blum--all emerge with veritable life in them. The trends of French interwar history are deftly carried through onto these pages with an unobtrusive lucidity and persuasiveness."--Michael Hurst, American Historical Review "Admirable...Instead of working backward from 1940, seeking causes and culprits of collapse in the 1930s, Ms. Hughes has wisely chosen to begin in 1918 and to focus upon the 1920s. This chronology has given her a fresher perspective and a wider scope for sympathy than other commentators of the period. It is the great merit of this book that it passes judgments with compassion and restraint. Indeed, Professor Hughes insists upon viewing French military policy in the broadest possible context of international developments, domestic politics, economic problems, and intellectual moods; from these elements, she weaves a dilemma of tragic dimensions in which the confusions and mistakes of individuals are reviewed with kindness and realism."--Charles C. Bright, Political Science Quarterly The decision to fortify northeastern France has usually been considered a tragic mistake, an example of bad planning and missed opportunities. Not so, says Judith M. Hughes, who provides a convincing view of how France's military and political leaders tried to safeguard their nation--and why they failed., The decision to fortify northeastern France has usually been considered a tragic mistake, an example of bad planning and missed opportunities. Not so, says Judith M. Hughes, who provides a convincing view of how France's military and political leaders tried to safeguard their nation and why they failed. "YA? stimulating and excellently documented book...Individual personalities are particularly well handled. Foch and Ptain, Poincar and Blum--all emerge with veritable life in them. The trends of French interwar history are deftly carried through onto these pages with an unobtrusive lucidity and persuasiveness." --Michael Hurst, American Historical Review "Admirable...Instead of working backward from 1940, seeking causes and culprits of collapse in the 1930s, Ms. Hughes has wisely chosen to begin in 1918 and to focus upon the 1920s. This chronology has given her a fresher perspective and a wider scope for sympathy than other commentators of the period. It is the great merit of this book that it passes judgments with compassion and restraint. Indeed, Professor Hughes insists upon viewing French military policy in the broadest possible context of international developments, domestic politics, economic problems, and intellectual moods; from these elements, she weaves a dilemma of tragic dimensions in which the confusions and mistakes of individuals are reviewed with kindness and realism." --Charles C. Bright, Political Science Quarterly, The decision to fortify north-eastern France has usually been considered a tragic mistake, an example of bad planning and missed opportunities. In this book, Judith M. Hughes provides a counter-argument, providing a convincing view of how France's military and political leaders tried to safeguard their nation, and why they failed., The decision to fortify northeastern France has usually been considered a tragic mistake, an example of bad planning and missed opportunities. Not so, says Judith M. Hughes, who provides a convincing view of how France's military and political leaders tried to safeguard their nation and why they failed., " A] stimulating and excellently documented book...Individual personalities are particularly well handled. Foch and P tain, Poincar and Blum--all emerge with veritable life in them. The trends of French interwar history are deftly carried through onto these pages with an unobtrusive lucidity and persuasiveness."--Michael Hurst, American Historical Review "Admirable...Instead of working backward from 1940, seeking causes and culprits of collapse in the 1930s, Ms. Hughes has wisely chosen to begin in 1918 and to focus upon the 1920s. This chronology has given her a fresher perspective and a wider scope for sympathy than other commentators of the period. It is the great merit of this book that it passes judgments with compassion and restraint. Indeed, Professor Hughes insists upon viewing French military policy in the broadest possible context of international developments, domestic politics, economic problems, and intellectual moods; from these elements, she weaves a dilemma of tragic dimensions in which the confusions and mistakes of individuals are reviewed with kindness and realism."--Charles C. Bright, Political Science Quarterly The decision to fortify northeastern France has usually been considered a tragic mistake, an example of bad planning and missed opportunities. Not so, says Judith M. Hughes, who provides a convincing view of how France's military and political leaders tried to safeguard their nation--and why they failed.

LC Classification NumberDC367.H84 2006