About this product

Product Identifiers

PublisherOxford University Press, Incorporated

ISBN-100198708963

ISBN-139780198708964

eBay Product ID (ePID)202425769

Product Key Features

Number of Pages182 Pages

LanguageEnglish

Publication NameEpistemological Disjunctivism

SubjectEpistemology, General, Logic

Publication Year2014

TypeTextbook

Subject AreaPhilosophy

AuthorDuncan Pritchard

FormatTrade Paperback

Dimensions

Item Height0.4 in

Item Weight7.1 Oz

Item Length8.5 in

Item Width5.6 in

Additional Product Features

Intended AudienceScholarly & Professional

Reviews"[T]his is a clearly written and carefully argued book that has made significant progress in developing and defending epistemological disjunctivism-it is a must-read for anyone with interests in the epistemology of perception." --International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 'Excellent ... an original, sophisticated, and well-articulated position ... Pritchard's style is clear, accessible, and engaging. 'Declan Smithies, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews'inspirational ... Pritchard dares to go where no contemporary epistemologist has gone before. 'Genia Schonbaumsfeld, University of Southampton'This is a fascinating and first-rate contribution to an important topic. It is clearly written, covers the ground in a thorough and balanced way, and deals masterfully with the pertinent literature ... a terrific book' Sven Bernecker, University of California, Irvine, "Excellent ... an original, sophisticated, and well-articulated position ... Pritchard's style is clear, accessible, and engaging." --Declan Smithies, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

Dewey Edition23

Dewey Decimal121

Table Of ContentAcknowledgementsIntroductionPart One: Epistemological Disjunctivism in Outline1. Epistemological Disjunctivism: A First Pass2. Motivating Epistemological Disjunctivism3. Three Prima Facie Problems for Epistemological Disjunctivism4. Metaphysical and Epistemological Disjunctivism5. Seeing That P and Knowing That P6. Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Epistemic Externalism/Internalism Distinction7. Resolving the Access ProblemNotes to Part OnePart Two: Favouring versus Discriminating Epistemic SupportIntroductory Remarks1. The Relevant Alternatives Account of Perceptual Knowledge2. Relevant Alternatives and Closure3. Three Epistemic Principles: Discrimination, Evidential Transmission and Favouring4. Favouring and Discriminating Epistemic Support5. Diagnosis6. A Two-Tiered Relevant Alternatives Theory7. Favouring versus Discriminating Epistemic Support and Epistemological DisjunctivismNotes to Part TwoPart Three: Radical ScepticismIntroductory Remarks1. Radical Scepticism2. Mooreanism3. Contemporary Neo-Mooreanism4. A Simpleminded Epistemological Disjunctivist Neo-Mooreanism5. Motivating Epistemological Disjunctivist Neo-Mooreanism6. Overriding versus Undercutting Anti-Sceptical Strategies7. Radical Scepticism and Quietism8. Knowing and Saying That One Knows9. Concluding RemarksNotes to Part ThreeBibliographyIndex

SynopsisDuncan Pritchard offers an original defence of epistemological disjunctivism. This is an account of perceptual knowledge which contends that such knowledge is paradigmatically constituted by a true belief that enjoys rational support which is both factive and reflectively accessible to the agent. In particular, in a case of paradigmatic perceptual knowledge that p , the subject's rational support for believing that p is that she sees that p , where this rational support is both reflectively accessible and factive (i.e., it entails p). Such an account of perceptual knowledge poses a radical challenge to contemporary epistemology, since by the lights of standard views in epistemology this proposal is simply incoherent. Pritchard's aim in Epistemological Disjunctivism is to show that this proposal is theoretically viable (i.e., that it does not succumb to the problems that it appears to face), and also to demonstrate that this is an account of perceptual knowledge which we would want to endorse if it were available on account of its tremendous theoretical potential. In particular, he argues that epistemological disjunctivism offers a way through the impasse between epistemic externalism and internalism, and also provides the foundation for a distinctive response to the problem of radical scepticism., Duncan Pritchard offers an original account of perceptual knowledge. He argues that it is paradigmatically constituted by true belief that enjoys rational support which is both factive and reflectively accessible to the agent. This resolves the issue between intermalism and externalism, and poses a radical challenge to contemporary epistemology., Duncan Pritchard offers an original defence of epistemological disjunctivism. This is an account of perceptual knowledge which contends that such knowledge is paradigmatically constituted by a true belief that enjoys rational support which is both factive and reflectively accessible to the agent. In particular, in a case of paradigmatic perceptual knowledge that p, the subject's rational support for believing that p is that she sees thatp, where this rational support is both reflectively accessible and factive (i.e., it entails p). Such an account of perceptual knowledge poses a radical challenge to contemporary epistemology, since by the lights of standardviews in epistemology this proposal is simply incoherent. Pritchard's aim in Epistemological Disjunctivism is to show that this proposal is theoretically viable (i.e., that it does not succumb to the problems that it appears to face), and also to demonstrate that this is an account of perceptual knowledge which we would want to endorse if it were available on account of its tremendous theoretical potential. In particular, he argues that epistemological disjunctivism offers a waythrough the impasse between epistemic externalism and internalism, and also provides the foundation for a distinctive response to the problem of radical scepticism., Duncan Pritchard offers an original defence of epistemological disjunctivism. This is an account of perceptual knowledge which contends that such knowledge is paradigmatically constituted by a true belief that enjoys rational support which is both factive and reflectively accessible to the agent. In particular, in a case of paradigmatic perceptual knowledge that p, the subject's rational support for believing that p is that she sees that p, where this rational support is both reflectively accessible and factive (i.e., it entails p). Such an account of perceptual knowledge poses a radical challenge to contemporary epistemology, since by the lights of standard views in epistemology this proposal is simply incoherent. Pritchard's aim in Epistemological Disjunctivism is to show that this proposal is theoretically viable (i.e., that it does not succumb to the problems that it appears to face), and also to demonstrate that this is an account of perceptual knowledge which we would want to endorse if it were available on account of its tremendous theoretical potential. In particular, he argues that epistemological disjunctivism offers a way through the impasse between epistemic externalism and internalism, and also provides the foundation for a distinctive response to the problem of radical scepticism.

LC Classification NumberBD161