About this product

Product Identifiers

PublisherMIT Press

ISBN-100262548283

ISBN-139780262548281

eBay Product ID (ePID)8064049390

Product Key Features

Book TitlePluralist Theory of Perception

Number of Pages358 Pages

LanguageEnglish

TopicCognitive Science, Mind & Body, Cognitive Neuroscience & Cognitive Neuropsychology, General

Publication Year2024

IllustratorYes

GenrePhilosophy, Science, Psychology

AuthorNeil Mehta

FormatTrade Paperback

Dimensions

Item Height1 in

Item Weight15.1 Oz

Item Length9 in

Item Width6 in

Additional Product Features

Intended AudienceTrade

LCCN2023-036889

TitleLeadingA

Dewey Edition23

Dewey Decimal121.34

Table Of ContentContents Preface Chapter 1. Rich pluralism introduced Part I: The case for partly revelatory awareness Chapter 2. A defense of Partial Revelation Chapter 3. Partial Revelation extended and explained Chapter 4. Hard problems of consciousness and the external world Part II. Rich pluralism vs. representationalism Chapter 5. Perception and hallucination Part III. Rich pluralism vs. naïve realism Chapter 6. Awareness of intrinsic characters Chapter 7. Strong referential character and presentation Chapter 8. Apparent presentational character Chapter 9. A final assessment of naïve realism Part IV. Other explanatory challenges Chapter 10. Phenomenal character Chapter 11. Arguments from hallucination Chapter 12. Conclusion Glossary References

SynopsisA new theory of perception that posits that conscious perception consists not of a single kind of awareness, but of two radically different kinds deployed in concert. Most contemporary theories of perception, including leading forms of representationalism and naive realism, are monistic - they assume that to consciously perceive is to deploy only one kind of sensory awareness. In A Pluralist Theory of Perception , Neil Mehta instead argues for pluralism , which says that to consciously perceive is to deploy two very different kinds of sensory awareness in concert. Mehta argues that pluralism can simultaneously explain what is common to all forms of consciousness and what is distinctive about conscious perception. Mehta's preferred version of pluralism, which he calls rich pluralism , says that conscious perception is constituted by successful sensory representation and deep awareness . Successful sensory representation is a representational form of awareness whose targets include particulars. It is found in perceptions, whether conscious or unconscious, but not in hallucinations. By contrast, deep awareness is a nonrepresentational form of sensory awareness whose targets are certain universals-the sensory qualities. Deep awareness constitutes one kind of consciousness, it is common to conscious perceptions and hallucinations, and it reveals part of the essences of its targets. Mehta argues that although rich pluralism appears to be less parsimonious than monism, it is not. All monistic theories that are explanatorily adequate end up being even more complex than rich pluralism. Thus, rich pluralism is the most spartan theory that can shoulder the explanatory load., A new theory of perception that posits that conscious perception consists not of a single kind of awareness, but of two radically different kinds deployed in concert. Most contemporary theories of perception, including leading forms of representationalism and naive realism, are monistic they assume that to consciously perceive is to deploy only one kind of sensory awareness. In A Pluralist Theory of Perception , Neil Mehta instead argues for pluralism , which says that to consciously perceive is to deploy two very different kinds of sensory awareness in concert. Mehta argues that pluralism can simultaneously explain what is common to all forms of consciousness and what is distinctive about conscious perception. Mehta's preferred version of pluralism, which he calls rich pluralism , says that conscious perception is constituted by successful sensory representation and deep awareness . Successful sensory representation is a representational form of awareness whose targets include particulars. It is found in perceptions, whether conscious or unconscious, but not in hallucinations. By contrast, deep awareness is a nonrepresentational form of sensory awareness whose targets are certain universals--the sensory qualities. Deep awareness constitutes one kind of consciousness, it is common to conscious perceptions and hallucinations, and it reveals part of the essences of its targets. Mehta argues that although rich pluralism appears to be less parsimonious than monism, it is not. All monistic theories that are explanatorily adequate end up being even more complex than rich pluralism. Thus, rich pluralism is the most spartan theory that can shoulder the explanatory load.

LC Classification NumberB808.9.M374 2024