Principal Agent Model : The Economic Theory of Incentives, Hardcover by Laffo...
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Principal Agent Model : The Economic Theory of Incentives, Hardcover by Laffo...
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Item specifics
- Condition
- Book Title
- Principal Agent Model : The Economic Theory of Incentives
- ISBN
- 9781843762409
About this product
Product Identifiers
Publisher
Elgar Publishing, Incorporated, Edward
ISBN-10
1843762404
ISBN-13
9781843762409
eBay Product ID (ePID)
2323882
Product Key Features
Number of Pages
720 Pages
Language
English
Publication Name
Principal Agent Model : the Economic Theory of Incentives
Publication Year
2003
Subject
Motivational, Economics / General, Economics / Theory
Type
Textbook
Subject Area
Business & Economics
Series
The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics Ser.
Format
Hardcover
Dimensions
Item Height
2.3 in
Item Weight
49.5 Oz
Item Length
9.7 in
Item Width
7.1 in
Additional Product Features
Intended Audience
Scholarly & Professional
LCCN
2003-049029
TitleLeading
The
Dewey Edition
21
Reviews
'The economics of asymmetric information has been the most important new tool of economic analysis and has proved powerful in explaining many aspects of the functioning of the economy. The principal-agent relation is a central aspect of asymmetric information. The anthology is exceptionally useful in bringing together every major paper in the field; its thoroughness reflects the deep knowledge of its editor, Jean-Jacques Laffont, one of the outstanding contributors to the field.'
Series Volume Number
Vol. 162
Illustrated
Yes
Dewey Decimal
330/.01
Table Of Content
Contents:AcknowledgementsIntroduction Jean-Jacques LaffontPART I FOUNDATIONS 1. Adam Smith (1776), 'Of the Discouragement of Agriculture in the Ancient State of Europe after the Fall of the Roman Empire'2. Chester I. Barnard (1938/1968), 'The Economy of Incentives'3. Kenneth J. Arrow (1963), 'Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care'4. Mark V. Pauly (1968), 'The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment'5. Richard Zeckhauser (1970), 'Medical Insurance: A Case Study of the Tradeoff between Risk Spreading and Appropriate Incentives'6. Michael Spence and Richard Zeckhauser (1971), 'Insurance, Information, and Individual Action'7. Stephen A. Ross (1973), 'The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem'PART II MORAL HAZARD 8. J.A. Mirrlees (1999), 'The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I'9. Bengt Holmström (1979), 'Moral Hazard and Observability'10. Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1983), 'An Analysis of the Principal-agent Problem'11. Ian Jewitt (1988), 'Justifying the First-order Approach to Principal-agent Problems'12. Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom (1991), 'Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design'13. William P. Rogerson (1985), 'Repeated Moral Hazard'PART III ADVERSE SELECTION 14. J.A. Mirrlees (1971), 'An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation'15. Michael Mussa and Sherwin Rosen (1978), 'Monopoly and Product Quality'16. Joseph E. Stiglitz (1977), 'Monopoly, Non-linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market'17. David P. Baron and Roger B. Myerson (1982), 'Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs'18. David P. Baron and David Besanko (1984), 'Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing'19. Roger Guesnerie and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1984), 'A Complete Solution to a Class of Principal-agent Problems with an Application to the Control of a Self-managed Firm'20. David P. Baron and David Besanko (1984), 'Regulation and Information in a Continuing Relationship'21. Douglas Gale and Martin Hellwig (1985), 'Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem'22. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1986), 'Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms'23. Tracy R. Lewis and David E.M. Sappington (1989), 'Countervailing Incentives in Agency Problems'24. Michael H. Riordan and David E.M. Sappington (1988), 'Optimal Contracts with Public ex post Information'PART IV ADVANCED TOPICS 25. Eric Maskin (1999), 'Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality'26. Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1986), 'Incentive Theory with Data Compression'27. Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1986), 'Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design'28. Jacques Crémer, Fahad Khalil and Jean-Charles Rochet (1998), 'Contracts and Productive Information Gathering'29. Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom (1987), 'Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives'30. John Moore and Rafael Repullo (1988), 'Subgame Perfect Implementation'31. Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole (1990), 'The Principal-agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values'32. Mark Armstrong and Jean-Charles Rochet (1999), 'Multi-dimensional Screening: A User's Guide'Name Index
Synopsis
Incentive theory is the most important development in economics in the last forty years. The principal-agent model is the core of this theory. This authoritative collection brings together the essential literature concerning the principal-agent model when no restrictions on the design of the principal's contract exist in terms of complexity, enforcement or rationality. Part I covers the foundations of the principal-agent theory from the first historical formulation of the problem to the first attempts to formalize it. Part II deals with the case of moral hazard and adverse selection is the topic of Part III. Part IV presents contributions on current research issues such as the impact of communication constraints, endogenous information structures and multidimensional incentive problems. The Principal Agent Model will be an indispensable reference source for all students, researchers and professionals specialising in this subject., Incentive theory has been a major development in economics and the principal-agent model is the core of this theory. This authoritative collection brings together the essential literature concerning the principal-agent model when no restrictions on the design of the principal's contract exist in terms of complexity, enforcement and rationality. historical formulation of the problem to the first attempts to formalize it. Part two deals with the case of moral hazard and adverse selection is the topic of Part three. Part four presents contributions on current research issues such as the impact of communication constraints, endogenous information structures and multidimensional incentive problems.
LC Classification Number
HB171.L22 2003
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