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Tally-Ho: RAF Tactical Leadership in the Battle of Britain, July 1940 by in Us
US $12.98
ApproximatelyS$ 16.77
Condition:
Very Good
A book that has been read but is in excellent condition. No obvious damage to the cover, with the dust jacket included for hard covers. No missing or damaged pages, no creases or tears, and no underlining/highlighting of text or writing in the margins. May be very minimal identifying marks on the inside cover. Very minimal wear and tear.
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Located in: Mansfield, Massachusetts, United States
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eBay item number:127064866450
Item specifics
- Condition
- ISBN
- 9781398111622
About this product
Product Identifiers
Publisher
Amberley Publishing
ISBN-10
1398111627
ISBN-13
9781398111622
eBay Product ID (ePID)
26058378643
Product Key Features
Book Title
Tally-Ho : Raf Tactical Leadership in the Battle of Britain, July 1940
Number of Pages
352 Pages
Language
English
Topic
Military / World War II, Military / Aviation, World
Publication Year
2023
Illustrator
Yes
Genre
History
Format
Hardcover
Dimensions
Item Height
1.3 in
Item Weight
22.9 Oz
Item Length
9.2 in
Item Width
6.1 in
Additional Product Features
Intended Audience
Trade
Reviews
Although tightly packed with information, the book is by no means an academic work, remaining highly readable. It is a welcome addition to the literature on the Battle of Britain.', History of War Magazine Although Tally-Ho might be a little too detailed for the average enthusiast, it really is a most interesting book, especially for the true connoisseur of aerial warfare.', Military History Matters Magazine It is a work of almost unbelievable depth of research by a former South African professor of geology, whose insight is quite remarkable.', Country Life Magazine, 'Although tightly packed with information, the book is by no means an academic work, remaining highly readable. It is a welcome addition to the literature on the Battle of Britain.'
Dewey Edition
23
Dewey Decimal
940.54211
Synopsis
The tactical abilities of small unit leaders were critical in winning the Battle of Britain and the many innovations and even experiments which they tried out during the active fighting merit examination. The pre-war Fighter Area Attacks much beloved of the Air Ministry and founded on the notion that incoming German bombers would be unescorted due to the distance from their German home bases would prove to be almost totally useless. Nobody then thought France would fall, enabling enemy fighters to be based just across the Channel. Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding built the defensive system and made it work before the war; he also prevented too many fighters from going to France. During the battle he played the strategic role, keeping Fighter Command in business while minimising losses; this was directly related to small British fighter formations, essentially a squadron - any raid would thus be attacked by a number of discrete squadrons - this approach reduced losses and ensured a sequence of attacks. Dowding's subordinate Group commanders, notably Keith Park of 11 Group, fought the actual tactical battle, deciding every day how many squadrons would be allocated to every raid. The squadron leaders needed to know German bomber formation and type to choose fighter attack methods, and the disposition of German escort fighters. It was a subtle, deadly balancing act to maintain the aggressiveness needed to break up bomber formations and allow follow-up destruction of straggling and struggling machines, yet limit casualties among their own pilots. In July 1940, the author shows how this was achieved or not achieved. In his analysis Patrick Eriksson is not afraid to say it as he sees it: 'The British fighters could never have won the Battle if they, like the Germans often did, attacked only when favourable conditions pertained.', Have the squadron leaders over southern England in that long autumn of 1940, and their supporting flight commanders who led the squadrons into battle, had been neglected in the history books? Patrick Eriksson thinks so., The tactical abilities of small unit leaders were critical in winning the Battle of Britain and the many innovations and even experiments which they tried out during the active fighting merit examination. The pre-war Fighter Area Attacks much beloved of the Air Ministry and founded on the notion that incoming German bombers would be unescorted due to the distance from their German home bases would prove to be almost totally useless. Nobody then thought France would fall, enabling enemy fighters to be based just across the Channel. Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding built the defensive system and made it work before the war; he also prevented too many fighters from going to France. During the battle he played the strategic role, keeping Fighter Command in business while minimising losses; this was directly related to small British fighter formations, essentially a squadron - any raid would thus be attacked by a number of discrete squadrons - this approach reduced losses and ensured a sequence of attacks.Dowding's subordinate Group commanders, notably Keith Park of 11 Group, fought the actual tactical battle, deciding every day how many squadrons would be allocated to every raid. The squadron leaders needed to know German bomber formation and type to choose fighter attack methods, and the disposition of German escort fighters. It was a subtle, deadly balancing act to maintain the aggressiveness needed to break up bomber formations and allow follow-up destruction of straggling and struggling machines, yet limit casualties among their own pilots. In July 1940, the author shows how this was achieved or not achieved. In his analysis Patrick Eriksson is not afraid to say it as he sees it: 'The British fighters could never have won the Battle if they, like the Germans often did, attacked only when favourable conditions pertained.'
LC Classification Number
D756.5
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